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Introduction
Aging populations exert increasing financial pressure on pension systems around the globe.
Therefore, this central feature of modern welfare states is, and has been, subject to many fundamental reforms. Facing similar problems, many governments opted for a variety of pension reforms (e.g. Gruber and Wise, 2007) . Typical examples include increasing eligibility ages (Mastrobuoni, 2009; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Ataly and Barret, 2015) , pension level adjustments (Haan and Prowse, 2014) , and pension system restructuring (Laun and Wallenius, 2013) . Apart from austerity debates fueled by the Great Recession, the imminent retirement of baby-boomer cohorts calls for fundamental reforms of old age security in most welfare states in the near future. Thus, evaluations on different pension reforms are highly relevant when discussing future pension policy design.
The German case is an excellent example. Until the late 1970s, the German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system was expanded. It became one of the world's most generous programs, both in terms of replacement rates and early retirement provisions. Population aging, German reunification, and high unemployment rates since the late 1970s, however, caused a rising fiscal imbalance. Since the early 1990s, the eligibility age has been increased, replacement rates have been lowered, and subsidies stimulating private old-age provisions have been introduced (e.g. . These reforms have direct implications for the financial situation of Germany's current and future pensioners. They alter the legal framework under which individual labor supply, retirement, savings, and fertility decisions are made (e.g. Börsch-Supan, 2000; Blundell, 2002) . The effects are vast as statutory pensions account for about 85% of the average household disposable income for the elderly population (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001 ).
This study scrutinizes disincentives that lead to permanent pension deductions and increase with the distance between the actual/early and normal retirement age. Since individuals still have a (limited) choice, disincentives differ from indiscriminating pension cuts or an increase in the legal eligibility age for early retirement. Further, from a theoretical perspective, Diamond and Mirrless (1978) find similar reforms to reduce moral hazard problems in the pension scheme. We contribute to the existing literature with an analysis of both actual and potential behavior to provide a detailed overview on effects of retirement disincentives. At this, we contrast positive effects on public finances to negative effects on affected individuals. To provide comprehensive evidence on disincentives in general, we model a broad range of disincentive levels. This range includes pension deductions of 0.3% per month of early retirement, which were actually introduced through a major 3 pension reform in Germany in 1992 (Hanel, 2010; Lüthen, 2016) . We analyze to what extent disincentives are able to steer retirement behavior and provide evidence on distributional, individual welfare and fiscal implications of reducing pensions for early retirees. Typical for pension reforms, the institutional changes were phased in, impacting birth cohorts to different degrees. Thus, evaluation is not trivial due to the lack of intra-cohort variation. We incorporate comprehensive dynamic incentives of labor market participation and retirement behavior by estimating a structural dynamic retirement model (e. g. Rust and Phelan, 1997; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2015) . The model assumes forward-looking agents who consider option values of possible retirement decisions and recognize the impact of their choices on the accumulation of pension wealth and future consumption possibilities. Further, we account for the incentives of wealth on retirement behavior by considering savings and wealth accumulation over the life-cycle.
Early retirement disincentives give individuals the choice to retire within a certain time period at the cost of actuarial adjustments. When modeling retirement behavior, dynamic incentives are particularly relevant because individuals account for the entire future stream of pension benefits (Coile and Gruber, 2007) . For an accurate estimation, we model the German tax and social security system in great detail and utilize high quality German administrative pension data. This enables us to disentangle other changes in the tax and pension system from the introduction of the disincentives, which induce cohort specific dynamic incentives. The inter-cohort variation in dynamic incentives helps identifying the structural parameters of our retirement model (e.g. Manoli et al., 2014) . Then, based on the estimated parameters, we simulate a variety of economic outcomes for a number of counterfactual scenarios with changing levels of retirement disincentives.
For working males and the disincentive level of the 1992 reform, we find a retirement entry delay of 4.1 months. Increasing the disincentives causes further delay; a tripling of the 1992 disincentive level encourages most individuals to abandon early retirement. We also find disincentives to increase inequality in expected earnings and pensions, to cause individual welfare losses, and to lead to positive net public returns. All three outcomes increase with the disincentive level, although with diminishing marginal effects. The welfare losses are heterogeneously spread across the earnings distribution and greatest for medium income earners. Still, at each disincentive level, the net public returns are about three times as high as monetarized individual welfare losses. Further, depending on disincentive level, net public returns account for up to 16% of total pension expenditure per individual. It follows that early retirement disincentives are able to substantially increase the pension system's financial stability. When comparing disincentives to indiscriminating pension cuts, we find that at similar levels of net public returns, pension cuts result in individual welfare losses that are 4 more than twice as high.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section describes the institutional setting in Germany and the data. Section 3 illustrates the conceptual framework. The core of the paper is Section 4, where we present our estimation results and conduct a policy analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional setting and data

German pension scheme
The German statutory pension system is a pay-as-you-go system of Bismarckian variety. The great majority of employees is mandatorily insured and contributes a percentage of their gross earnings up to a contribution ceiling. For their contributions, the insurants acquire pension entitlements in form of earnings (or remuneration) points. The number of points is based on the ratio of individual where corresponds to the pension value. Basically, the pension value is the amount of money that is multiplied with the sum of earnings points to calculate the monthly pension. The value is adjusted every calendar year (for an overview see Table 1 below). represents the pension type, which is 1 for old-age pensions. The factor is introduced by the 1992 reform and accounts for the actual retirement age and corresponding early retirement deductions: 1 .
The pension scheme offers various retirement possibilities depending on the retiree's individual situation. We focus on agents who have a choice between continuing to work and retirement, therefore abstracting from previously unemployed or disabled individuals. The individuals considered are able to claim the normal old-age pension at age 65 or the pension for long-term insured after age 63, which is conditioned on having spent at least 35 years in the pension system. 2
Retiring before age 65 is considered as early retirement. Women are excluded due to their diverging pension prospects and the low number of cases when conditioning on similar early retirement eligibility. In sum, we concentrate on men with a strong labor market attachment who are eligible to retire at age 63, even if they choose to work longer.
Introduction of early retirement disincentives
In 1992, Germany introduced a major pension reform to equalize different retirement ages monetarily. The aim was to balance the pension wealth of early retirees and normal retirees.
However, the budget relief was also needed to ensure financial stability (e.g. Schmähl, 2011 
Data
To calculate pension entitlements as described above, the pension insurance collects information on all contributors' earnings biographies. The data we use, the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskontenstichprobe, VSKT), is a stratified random sample of these records. Each wave contains information on individuals aged between 30 and 67 in the reference year. 4 From age 14 through age 65, the VSKT provides a monthly history of employment, unemployment, sickness, and earnings points. The latter are used to compute monthly gross earnings and their total sum provides the foundation for calculating gross pensions. To obtain net incomes from earnings, pensions, and social transfers, we subtract taxes and social security contributions according to the current legal 6 status. Hereby, we account for all regulations and changes affecting monthly disposable income and pensions. Further, this allows us to compute real net lifetime incomes until age 63.
To ensure early retirement eligibility, we restrict the sample to those who have spent at least 35 years in the pension system before turning 63. This also ensures that the sample does not include individuals with substantial labor market earnings unnoticed by the Federal Pension Insurance (i.e. self-employed, civil servants, or long-term emigrants). Further, we exclude individuals who have worked in the German Democratic Republic (GDR; the former East Germany). For the cohorts considered, neither labor market situation nor working life is comparable to the West German context. 5 The final sample contains 945 individuals (Table 1) .
While German social security data records earnings very accurately, one major drawback is the top coding of earnings information at the contribution ceiling. For a better approximation of true distribution of earnings above the ceiling, we impute earnings of all individuals affected by top coding. The imputation method is based on the assumption of Pareto-distributed earnings in the upper tail of the distribution. 6 Further, the VSKT lacks information on other income sources, wealth or household context. Comparing the considered population to survey data shows that other income sources account on average for less than 10% of total household (Table A5) . We use the model to predict a wealth distribution and validate this distribution with survey data. Concerning the household context, nearly 80% are married, but spouses only contribute a small share of household income (Table A5 ). Accordingly, we assume a married single-earner household and joint taxation. For robustness, we also calculate a scenario assuming single households (Tables B1 and B2 ). The results do not suggest a qualitative difference. 
Model and estimation
Dynamic retirement model
The model aims to explain retirement behavior in a time frame of 24 months, namely between age 63 and age 65. Individuals are assumed to be forward-looking and have rational expectations about the consequences of their choices. We rely on a theoretical framework where agents' utility in period depends on consumption and disutility of labor . There are individuals indexed by .
Individual age is measured discretely in months , where 0 corresponds to the month an agent turns 63. Age 100 corresponds to period . Consumption in t for individual equals the net income flow minus savings. Agent 's utility in month can be expressed as:
(1) ,
Further, we allow for concavity of the agent's utility function. Current and future consumption possibilities in month depend on earnings biography and choices until the current period, whereas disutility of labor is allowed to vary in age . Equation (1) where marks the period (age) of retirement and indicates individual's probability of being alive in period , conditional on survival until retirement and belonging to cohort . Cohort specific mortality rates ensure a realistic setup and also help identifying parameters in the estimation procedure by inducing cohort-specific heterogeneity in dynamic incentives. 8 comprises all deductions from gross wage and pension income (i.e. income tax and social security contributions).
Since individuals need to consider all current and future wages when making a decision, wage information until age 65 needs to be complete. In case of early retirement, some monthly wages between ages 63 and 65 are unobserved. We impute the counterfactual wage relying on the last real 9 wage observed in the respective month of the previous year. This corresponds to the wage observed 12 or 24 month before the imputation and accounts for monthly wage volatility.
Disutility of labor
, is both a function of age and (since there is no more disutility of labor after retirement). For the explicit form, we assume a time separable random utility model representing individual preferences that satisfy our assumptions on consumption and disutility of labor:
(3) , , ,
We assume the random component to be type 1 extreme value distributed. The random component represents unobserved individual utility shocks. is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and a consumption weight. To allow the disutility of labor to vary in age, age enters , as a linear spline function. The function is allowed to change the slope every three months of age to ensure a flexible specification (see Appendix B.1).
When timing retirement, agents are forward looking and maximize their expected lifetime utility according to their preferences constrained by the institutional setting. For each month between ages 63 and 65, agents decide between continuing to work or retirement. When continuing to work, utility stems from consumption and individuals experience disutility of labor. After retirement, agents receive utility from consumption only. In line with the rules and regulations of the pension system, working individuals accumulate pension claims proportional to real wages. This creates dynamic incentives for individuals taken into account by the dynamic choice framework. Retirement is an absorbing state and agents are not allowed to return to work, making utility maximization an optimal stopping problem. Earliest possible retirement choice is at 1 in the month following the 63 rd birthday, latest possible early retirement decision is in the month they turn 65 ( 24). Each month , individual observes state variables and makes retirement choice to maximize expected lifetime utility. We define to be the choice set available to individual in period :
(4) max ∈ , with denoting a monthly subjective time discount factor, which we derive from a yearly discount factor of 0.97. To accommodate our monthly setting, we implement √0.97 . indicates individual probabilities of being alive in period , conditional on survival until period and belonging to cohort .
We further define a Markov transition function | , to capture individual beliefs about future states. Given the model setup, this is a deterministic function. Only the utility shock evolves stochastically. Then, the agents' maximization problem can be described by the following value function :
where ⋅ represents a multivariate probability density function of the random components.
contains all possible different states in 1 given state . The difference in the expected discounted future utility between working and not working reflects option values of respective choices.
Choice probabilities and estimation
Given the finite horizon of the individuals' optimization problem, it can be solved recursively.
Starting point is the expected value function ⋅ for particular choice options in the last period .
⋅ needs to be computed for all possible choices. In the last period , this corresponds to (6) , , .
By Bellman's principle of optimality, the individual's optimization problem can be written as a twoperiod problem for all other time periods , which take into account the optimal decision for 1.
Due to the type 1 extreme value distribution of the utility shock , the expected value function has a closed form solution (Rust, 1987 ):
, ,
Computation of expected value functions between mandatory retirement (age 65) and is comparatively simple as individual choices are limited until age 65. Thereafter, consumption streams remain constant. Rust (1987) shows that when assuming additive separability and conditional independence of utility shocks, conditional choice probabilities have a closed form solution:
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function of the sample is given by
indicating the individual choice observed in period and the vector , , , . . , containing all parameters of the utility function. The likelihood contributions then correspond to the respective conditional choice probabilities. For robustness, we also estimate a model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . We do not find any significant unobserved heterogeneity in the disutility of work. This likely follows from explicitly accounting for heterogeneous wealth accumulation in the model, which is associated with observed lifetime net income until age 63.
Parameter estimates and model fit
An overview on parameter estimates is displayed in 
Results and policy analysis
This section sheds light on the "dose-response" relationship between disincentive level and outcome measure. We simulate scenarios for different disincentive levels from 0% to 1% per month of early retirement. Applying a distance of 0.1%, we obtain 11 different scenarios. This range of levels includes the actually implemented level of 0.3% and therefore a full analysis of the 1992 reform. We present predominantly graphical results and mark the 0.3% level with a vertical dashed line. For consistency, the results are based on cohorts 1939 to 1945 which are fully affected by the 1992 reform.
A. Behavioral effects
Here we look at the effects of disincentives on labor market exit timing and wealth accumulation. 2). Other behavioral changes concern the impact of disincentives on wealth accumulation and savings rate. These effects are fairly small (see Appendix C.2). Figure 3 also shows a similar relationship between disincentive level and NPVs. The lowest NPV realized is associated with a disincentive level of 0.2%. At a level of 0.3%, the increases in labor market earnings start to outweigh the decreases in pension level. The variations refer to NPVs at age 63 that are annuitized over the remaining lifetime. The estimates provide quantifications for the average decline in individual welfare and further allow a disaggregated analysis of individual welfare losses along the income distribution.
Both Gini and CV show a concave relationship to the level of disincentives. Increases at low disincentives levels cause large increases in Gini and CV. Increases at higher disincentive levels have smaller effects since at high disincentive levels, the average retirement age is close to 65 already 11 A compensating variation (CV) indicates the amount of money that an individual would have to receive at age 63 to be fully compensated for a particular reform. Here, to compute CVs, we employ an iterative algorithm targeting the expected remaining lifetime utilities at age 63 without retirement disincentives. The algorithm converges when the differences in individuals' expected utilities under both scenarios (disincentives and no disincentives) are very small. For a detailed analysis, we again focus on the 0.3% disincentive level implemented by the 1992 reform. Figure 5 shows a non-parametric regression of estimated compensating variations on the NPVs. The results suggest that medium income earners lose most through the introduction of retirement disincentives. This is driven by earnings-level heterogeneity in the expected retirement age and pension level. Low income earners have relatively low CVs due to their small pension claims.
Medium income earners suffer most, as they have average claims but the lowest expected retirement age. High income earners have small CVs because they tend to retire closer to age 65 regardless of disincentives. In general, the individual welfare losses are heterogeneously distributed in the sample population, ranging from negligible amounts up to about €20,000 (see Appendix C.1).
This complicates compensation through e.g. saving subsidies because such a scheme may not allow targeting individuals according to their specific losses. 12 12 Indeed, in 2002 Germany introduced subsidies for private pension plans to compensate employees for lower levels of expected PAYG-pensions due to various reforms. For a distributional analysis and further details see Corneo et al. (2015) . 
E. Alternative reforms
To set the welfare losses into perspective, we simulate scenarios where we indiscriminately cut all pensions by a certain amount, ranging from 1% to 10% (Figure 7) . It turns out that to yield equal net public returns to introducing a 0.3%-disincentive level, all pensions would have to be lowered by about 7%. However, pension cuts more than double the individual welfare losses. This holds also true for higher levels of net public returns. Since individuals barely adjust their retirement behavior when confronted with a pension cut, nearly all the net public returns stem from decreased pensions:
€100 per month instead of €38 under the 0.3% disincentive level. These findings suggest that disincentives realize financial gains at lower individual costs than pension cuts (see Appendix B.2 for more detailed results). 
Conclusion
This study evaluates the effectiveness of early retirement disincentives and its distributional, individual welfare and fiscal implications. We focus on disincentives leading to permanent pension deductions that increase with the distance between actual/early and normal retirement age. We However, at each disincentive level, the net public returns are more than five times as high as the individual welfare losses.
Contrary to many public claims, disincentives do not correspond to an indiscriminating pension cut.
In fact, at equal levels of net public returns, disincentives cause individual welfare losses that are less than half as large as those under a pension cut. Hence, the pension system's financial situation can be improved, ceteris paribus, with lower welfare costs through changes in the incentive scheme.
Concerning future implications, Germany introduced various major pension reforms, two of which can be directly related to our results. The first reform increases the normal retirement age from age 65 to 67 while the early retirement age remains at 63. This potentially raises the disincentives for early retirees. Here, our results suggest that average retirement age increases and average pensions adjust slightly for individuals still employed at 62. The second reform introduces an exception to the rule by abolishing disincentives for pensioners with very long employment histories. According to our results, this will cause a substantial decline in average retirement age for eligible individuals. A more detailed analysis is left for future research.
Appendix Appendix A: Taxation, social security contributions and sample selection
The income from PAYG-pensions and employment constructed from the available information provided in the VSKT is gross. To obtain net incomes, we subtract social security contributions and personal income taxes from gross earnings and pensions. Because the burden of taxes and social security contributions heavily depends on whether being an employee or retiree, a concise overview of the procedure and underlying assumptions to obtain net incomes is provided in subsections A.1 and A.2. Sample construction is covered in subsection A.3.
A.1 Social security contributions
The calculation of social security contributions is straightforward. Regular employees considered in our sample must contribute to the pension, unemployment, health and long term care insurance.
Pensioners only have to contribute to the health and long term care insurance. Note that rates for pensioners and regular employees differ. Assessment basis is insurable income up to the respective contribution ceiling. Tables A1 and A2 list the key determinants used for calculating statutory social security contributions for the 1998 to 2011 assessment years. Displayed contribution rates are annual averages. In case of the statutory health insurance, actual contribution rates differ between insurance providers. Our calculation assumes the average contribution rates published by Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2014). Further, employees with earnings above the compulsory insurance exemption limit may opt for a private health insurance instead of the statutory. We disregard this possibility.
Between 1998 and 2011, employees face a joint burden on gross earnings from contributions of roughly 23%, not including the employer's share. Social security contributions are usually almost evenly split between employee and employer. Gross earnings are net of employer's contribution and therefore only the employee's contributions need to be deducted. The burden differs with total remuneration. Low income earners and those receiving incomes above the respective contribution ceilings of the various branches of the social security system are subject to a lower relative burden.
Social security contributions are calculated on hypothetical gross annual earnings and then deducted from gross monthly earnings. In contrast to employees, pensioners are subject to a combined average burden of 8 -10%, which is deducted from the monthly pension. 20 
A.3 Data
The dataset consists of the waves of SUFVSKT of calendar years 2002 and 2004-2012. Each SUF is a 25% stratified random sample of the VSTK of the respective year and includes the same information.
Since we need completed biographies to clearly identify the timing of old-age retirement, we focus on cohorts aged 66 or 67 in the respective year only. This means that usable observations for cohorts 1938-1945 appear in two different waves, once aged 66 and once aged 67. Due to the sampling structure it is possible to match those two waves for each of these cohorts and enhance the number of observations. Since there is no unique identifier across all waves, we identify duplicates (whom appear in both waves) on the basis of their employment biographies. For the selected cohorts, those biographies consist of monthly earnings points observations included from age 14 onwards up to the age of 66. Therefore, we draw on a large number of data points for the matching procedure and do not have to make any assumptions. For identification we use the entire employment history (at least 420 month/35 years) of as well as the year and month of birth.
Verification checks further confirm the correctness of our procedure. Certainly, the matching procedure might be problematic for individuals without a strong labor market attachment -but those are not the persons we focus on.
Appendix B: Model specification
This section shows some details regarding our model specification. We assume that individuals accumulate wealth for retirement between ages 20 and 63. While this is an abstraction, it allows for adjustments in wealth accumulation in response to changes in the pension system.
For the choice of the savings rate, individuals maximize expected remaining lifetime utility at age 20 while anticipating their future retirement choice. This is done by solving a maximization problem analogous to equation (4). The maximization accounts for two things. First, it considers subjectively discounted expected utility flows from consumption between ages 20 and 63. These flows are based on both equation (3) and annuitized observed lifetime net income minus savings (i.e. consumption).
All flows are weighted with cohort-specific probabilities of surviving until the respective periods.
Second, the problem incorporates the subjectively discounted , which corresponds to expected remaining lifetime utility at age 63 for optimal retirement choices. The vector of state variables at age 63, , contains both the savings rate chosen at age 20 and the associated wealth at age 63. We denote expected utility from consumption between ages 20 and 63, measured at age 20, as . This leads to the following optimization problem that determines the individual savings rates: max 63| 20, *
We solve the problem by computing the expected remaining lifetime utility at age 20 for a grid of savings rates between 0% and 15% (31 grid points with uniform intervals of 0.5%).
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Appendix C: Additional results and robustness
Here we provide results on the actually implemented reform level (subsection C.1), wealth by disincentive level (subsection C.2), effects of different institutional changes described in Appendix A (subsection C.3) and parameter estimates and robustness for a scenario assuming single households only (subsection C.4).
C.1 Additional result for the actually implemented disincentive level of 0.3% Figure 
C.3 Effects of different institutional changes
Here we document the effects of various alternative reforms apart from the introduction of disincentives. Table C1 shows the effects of certain tax/pension parameters on retirement age.
These effects are measured by assuming the values from 1998 (the first year of this study) for all other years. Table C2 lists the effects of pension cuts. 
